Why Modern Problems Demand New Ways of Thinking
From events to systems: introducing the Spiderweb Order Analytical Framework
Major geopolitical crises rarely suffer from a lack of information. They often suffer from a lack of integration.
Within hours of a significant event, governments issue assessments, journalists reconstruct timelines, think tanks publish commentary, and specialists from across the strategic community begin interpreting its significance. Many of these analyses are thoughtful, rigorous and evidence-based. Yet they often arrive at markedly different conclusions while drawing upon many of the same facts. The difference frequently lies not in the quality of the evidence, but in the assumptions that shape the analysis. Analysts approach problems through different disciplines, different professional experiences and different questions. Each perspective reveals something important. Yet as the strategic environment has become increasingly interconnected, it has also become increasingly difficult for any single disciplinary lens to capture the behaviour of the system as a whole.
The strategic environment has changed.
Our methods of understanding it must evolve accordingly.
Contemporary strategic competition rarely unfolds within a single domain. Political pressure may be reinforced through economic coercion, amplified by information operations, enabled by cyber activity, and supported by military signalling. Increasingly, states pursue integrated campaigns that combine diplomatic, economic, technological, informational and military instruments to shape the behaviour of other states without necessarily crossing the threshold of conventional war. While each of these activities can be examined independently, their strategic significance emerges from the way they interact as a system. The increasing integration of contemporary strategic competition places greater value on analytical methodologies that begin with the system as a whole before examining its constituent parts.
This is not a failure of expertise. In many respects, it is the result of its success.
Over the past century, every strategic discipline has developed extraordinary depth. Political scientists have deepened our understanding of institutions and governance. Economists have refined our understanding of markets, incentives and coercion. Military professionals have advanced the study of strategy, deterrence and force. Intelligence practitioners have developed sophisticated approaches to influence, attribution and decision-making. Specialists across cyber security, law, technology and the social sciences continue to expand our collective understanding of an increasingly complex world.
The challenge facing contemporary strategic analysis is therefore not a lack of expertise. It is the integration of expertise. As strategic competition becomes increasingly interconnected, the ability to synthesise knowledge across disciplines becomes as important as the depth of knowledge within them.
An economist may identify the mechanisms of coercion. An intelligence analyst may recognise an influence campaign. A cyber specialist may detect malicious activity. A military planner may assess force posture. A political scientist may explain institutional dynamics. Individually, each analysis may be accurate, rigorous and deeply informed. Yet none, in isolation, fully explains the strategic behaviour of the system from which these activities emerge.
The challenge is no longer developing expertise. It is learning how to connect expertise in ways that reflect the increasingly integrated character of contemporary strategic competition.
History has repeatedly shown that as the character of competition changes, so too must the methods we use to understand it. The emergence of air power, nuclear deterrence, cyber operations and networked conflict each required new conceptual frameworks alongside existing disciplines. Today’s increasingly integrated strategic environment presents a similar challenge—not because earlier approaches were wrong, but because the object of analysis has evolved.
It was this question that led me to begin developing what eventually became Spiderweb Order.
For several years I found myself returning to the same practical question:
How do we develop a coherent understanding of strategic environments that no longer behave within disciplinary boundaries?
As geopolitical competition became increasingly integrated across political, economic, technological, informational and military domains, I became convinced that our analytical methods needed to begin with the system itself before examining its individual components. Spiderweb Order emerged from that conviction—not as an attempt to replace existing disciplines, but as a systems-first methodology designed to help integrate them.
Mark Carney’s address at the 2026 World Economic Forum did not provide the answers I was searching for. It did something more important. It crystallised the scale of the transition taking place within the international system and convinced me that it was time to begin articulating, publicly, ideas I had been wrestling with privately for several years. Spiderweb Order grew from that decision.
This weekend I will publish Version 1.0 of the Spiderweb Order Analytical Guide.
The Guide is intended to be used rather than simply read. It provides a structured analytical methodology that readers will be able to apply across a wide range of strategic and organisational problems.
It is not intended as the final word, nor as a comprehensive theory of strategic affairs. Rather, it is the first public articulation of a methodology that has gradually taken shape through the Spiderweb Order essay series.
My hope is that it provides readers with a practical methodology for understanding increasingly interconnected strategic problems through a systems-first analytical framework.
Spiderweb Order was never intended to replace existing strategic thought, nor compete with the extraordinary body of knowledge developed across established disciplines. It was developed as a practical attempt to organise increasingly complex strategic environments into a form that could be understood more coherently. Its purpose is to provide a systems-first methodology through which diverse forms of expertise can be connected, allowing analysts to move beyond isolated observations toward a more integrated understanding of contemporary strategic competition.
Few readers will work professionally in every field touched by contemporary strategic competition. Yet all of us increasingly encounter systems whose behaviour cannot be understood through isolated events alone. Learning to think systematically about those systems is becoming an increasingly valuable civic and professional capability.
Analytical frameworks are not ends in themselves. Their value lies in the quality of the questions they encourage us to ask, the conversations they enable, and ultimately the strategic choices they help inform. In an era of increasingly interconnected competition, better understanding is not an academic exercise. It is part of our collective capacity to adapt.
Better analysis does more than improve our understanding of complex problems. It establishes the foundation from which more effective strategic design can emerge. When we begin with systems rather than isolated events, new strategic possibilities become visible—not because the facts have changed, but because the relationships between them become clearer.
The purpose of Spiderweb Order is not to provide all the answers. It is to improve our understanding of complex adaptive systems well enough to design better responses to the challenges they present. Better questions remain the beginning of that process—but they are no longer its end.
As the strategic environment continues to evolve, so too must the ways we learn to understand it.